Abstract
Introduction
The access control technology came firstly as a security protection approach for the dataset in large computer systems in 1980s. In the following thirty years, a various of new access control strategies were proposed, of which the most widely used were discretionary access control(DAC), mandatory access control(MAC) and role-based access control(RBAC) [1] . Their fundamental objectives then were to prevent the illegal user from logging into the specific system and the legal user from using the system resource illegally. As a critical technology for achieving a safe system operation, the access control technology is a solution to the system safety and a key approach for guaranteeing the information confidentiality and integrity. The research on the access control is attracting an increasing attention in the field of computer science.
The cloud computing was a developed and commercial result of the distributed computing, the parallel computing and the grid computing [2] . By dividing a big computing task into several small ones, the cloud computing carried out them on a massive distributed computers instead that of on several local computers or remote servers. As to the secure cloud services, it was a important aspect for the cloud computing to consider how to carry out a security certificate as well as a access control management [3] . Some scholars proposed many correspondent methods of user authentication and access control according to its characteristics. Yassin et.al [4] put forward an authentication technology of the cloud computing based on a public key and a mobility. Achieving a user identification [5] with the access control module in the Hadoop platform, Chang et.al [6] present a access control method for the cloud computing with the fingerprint as well as the face image. Abdulrahman et.al [7] bring a distributed access control architecture for cloud computing based on the synergy theory of the tight and loose coupling. Celesti et.al [8] gave a reference infrastructure for the identity management in the cloud computing. Lin et.al [9] described a BLP and Biba based access control model to distribute different users with a corresponding permission according to their behavior characteristics . However, these solutions all had some limitations on the user access control of a complex environment in the cloud computing.
As one of the hottest applications of the cloud computing, the cloud simulation was proposed currently as a new modeling as well as simulation mode and had attracted rapidly a wide attention from both industrial and academic communities. There are two types of new demands [10] in the development of the cloud simulation, which are: 1) Due to the expanding and increasingly complex scale as well as the structure, a distributed, heterogeneous, synergistic, interoperable and reusable simulation system is in an urgent need.
2) The people hope to be able to obtain smoothly the needed simulation service from the network at any time and any place. Based on the fact that the traditional access control strategy couldn't satisfy efficiently these emerging demands, this paper proposed firstly a tree proxy-based and service-oriented access control model (TPSAC) by transforming a Grid-HLA based Grid Simulation platform into a Cloud Simulation platform. Then combining with several scene models of the production line [11, 12] (See Figure 1 ) and the CloudSim cloud simulation platform [13] , this paper gave also an experimental result. 2) BP is a permission bitmap that each bit represents a meta permission except for B 1 . If B 1 =0, this PPS package uses only the basic bitmap, otherwise the extended bitmap. If B i =1, it will activate the data field bit P i-1 bitmap. (3) PV is a value sequence, which contains a weight and a lifetime, of the meta permission set that is in the same order as with that of the part 2 bitmap. In the value sequence, each field that with 8 bits, uses 2 condensed BCD codes to express the meta permission value. For example, V 1 = (0001 1111) 2 =(1F) BCD .
Definition 2 (Meta Permission Sets，MPS）Because the system resource OBS = FO∪DO，where FO is the function object and DO is the data object, the total meta permission set MPS = {（obj，op，i）｜obj∈OBS，op∈OPS，i ∈N}，where MetaPerm = （obj，op，i） is a meta permission and a elementary unit during authorization, OPS is the operation set, and I is the lifetime or the weight that reflects the credibility and reliability of its role. As already involved the information of op and i in the PPS package, the meta permission set can be also expressed as, MPS = {（obj，pps）｜obj∈OBS，pps∈PPS}。After getting rid of the overlapping permission, the total valid permission set P = {p ｜ p i ∈MPS∧ p j ∈MPS∧i≠j→p i ∩p j = Ø }。 Definition 3 (Proxy-based Tree Set，T) The proxy-based tree AccBTree ,which encloses the role based meta permission set , is a dynamic object that generated when a role was activated by a user. It can be descript by a quadruple< R, PPS，ST，Lifetime>, where R is the activated role set, ST is the tree status set, Lifetime is the tree lifetime.
Definition 4 (Function load，destroy，state).
Let D= {t｜t ∈T }. Then, define load (t) as the tree loading time, destroy (t) as the tree destroying time with Lifetime (t)= destroy (t) -load (t), and state (t)∈{0,1,2,3}as four tree states which represent separately the ready, running, suspended and the final state. Then, it meets the following rules according to the principle of least privilege.
Rule 1 t(t∈D∧(load (t)=0)∧(load (t) = destory (t))→(state(t)=0) Rule 2 t(t∈D∧(load (t)=0)∧(load (t) != destory (t))→(state(t)=1) Rule 3 t(t∈D∧(load (t)>0)∧(load (t) = destory (t))→(state(t)=3)) Rule 4 t(t∈D∧(load (t)>0)∧(load (t) != destory (t))→((state(t)=1)∨(state(t)=2)) Definition 5 (Service， S)
. The service is a important concept in the SOA architecture. It is a kind logic unit that is able to provide a specific and reusable business function to some other application systems. Loose coupling is one of the main service attributes. 
The Model Definition
In order to satisfy fully the integrity constraints of task flows and enhance system security, the user permission is not only subject to the performed role but also subject to the actual task status. When a role is activated by one user, it activates accordingly a dynamic and temporary proxy-based tree AccBTree. As a atomic function in SOA, the AccBTree could be created parametrically when executing a task and be released when terminating a task. Thus, the system could recycle the previous assigned user permission. Figure 2 shows a frame of the TPSAC model.
Figure 2. TPSAC Model

Definition 10 (TPSAC Model). TPSAC=<U,R,MP,T,S>
,where U is the user set, R is the role set, MP is the meta permission set, T is the Proxy-based tree set, S is the service set, UA is the User Assignment, PA is the Permission Assignment and TA is the Tree Assignment. Then RR is the compound and inherited role relation, and SR is the constrained service relation.
The process when a role obtains a permission service is also the one when a proxy-based tree is spanned with its status changing. The status and the constraint condition of this tree determine whether a service is allowed. There are three phases in TPSAC, which are a global static permission assignment, a proxy-based tree spanning and a dynamic permission adjustment.
(1) Global static permission assignment. The main function of this stage contains a role distribution for users and a predefinition of role permission. The distribution function Perm_Assign(r) is used to correlate UA and PA.
(2) Proxy-based tree spanning. In TPSAC model, there in no immediate relation between the role and the permission. When a user activates a role, the system generates a instance of AccBTree. This function is defined as Create_Tree(r, s).
(3) Dynamic permission adjustment. This stage includes a change to the meta permission by Change_Meta_Value(Vi, Value) and to the tree status by Chang_Tree_State(stValue). Let MT（u, p）denote that u has the related right to carry out p, then its necessary condition for being performed is MT(u, p)→ ∃ r(u∈UA(r)∩p∈PA(r)∩t∈T∩state(t)=1∩(setValue<v i )).
The Model Advantages
Compared with the service oriented access control model of paper [14] , the TPSAC model has the following advantages, as: (1) Use a proxy-based service tree to support a multilevel inherited role. In the TPSAC model, the role related meta permission was encapsulated in the PPS package of a proxy-based binary tree. So, the role inheritance corresponds to that of tree.
(2) Use a meta permission to support a quantized access control. In the practical application, the permission has not only the attribute of quality, but that of quality. For example, as to the presidential election in the political field, the Constitution stipulates clearly that every citizen aged eighteen or over has the right to vote, but the election is only valid when there are more than half of them involved in this voting. The present of meta permission cloud support well this quantized access control. (3) Use a compressed PPS package to support a multilevel secure access control. Because there is one PPS package that has 1+32+8*31=281 bits（71bits for BCD code）for 31 predefined meta permissions of each role in the TPSAC model, the compression degree is very high. Under the premise of supporting the principle of least privilege and the principle of separation of duties, these encapsulated and packaged permissions could enhance a better system security.
The TPSAC based Cloud Simulation
The Simulation Frame
The High Level Architecture(HLA) was proposed by the United States Department of Defense [15] . It is a technical specification for the distributed simulation system and can be split into a HLA regulation, a interface specification and a object model template. In HLA, a federation was consisted of simulation systems(federates), supported software and related components [16] . There are three levels in the web service of HLA, which are the federate level, the RTI level and the federate/RTI level [17] . Due to the difficulty in achieving a web service based RTI, this TPSAC system gives an incomplete expansion on RTI level by introducing a grid service. The extended service includes a GC-RTI Grid service and a GFM-RTI Handle service. Then the user federate can go through firewall by calling the grid based CRC service. The permission service contains a authorization service from the AuthorityDistr SYS and a authentication service from the TAccessBTree. Figure 3 shows a TPSAC and Grid-HLA based cloud simulation frame. 
Scene modeling
Scene modeling [11] includes physical as well as behavioral modeling of federate. All federates in JPL and FPL are objects of physical modeling. Because of the limited space, this paper describes only scene modeling process of cracking and pitting machine. Three major physical mechanisms of cracking and pitting machine are material division, cracking and pitting. As cam mechanism is the core component of cracking and pitting machine, this paper gives only its behavioral modeling process, of which includes kinematics modeling and dynamic modeling, as shown in figure 4 , where figure a is the cylindrical camshaft to be analyzed, figure b is the kinematics model that gained after the expansion for cylindrical camshaft in coordinate plane YOZ, and figure c is the dynamic model for cam while doing a uniform motion on Z axis. In figure c, let f 1 be the friction coefficient between push rod and haft, f 2 be the friction coefficient between cam bond and bevel gear, G be the gravity of haft, N p be the normal pressure on the cam bond that generated by bevel gear, L be the distance between action point of N p and haft center, N be the supports reaction between push rod and haft. Then, some equations that gained directly from this figure can be expressed as follows: 
Then N can be obtained from equations (3) 
The Simulation Process
Due to the limit space, this paper provides only the implementation procedure of the permission service in figure 3 , omitting that of federates, LRC and CRC. The implementation procedure includes a global static authorization service that provided by a AuthorityDistr SYS, and a dynamic authorization as well as authentication service by a TAccessBTree that created with function Create_Tree(r id , s id ). The concrete implementation processes of these two services are as shown in figure 5 , where the proxy-based service tree TAccessBTree is in the dashed box.
(a)Global Static Authorization (b)Dynamic Authorization and Authentication Figure 5 . The Simulation Process of the TPSAC Model
The Simulation Algorithm
The TPSAC based service tree is actually a resource tree with permission information. So the TPSAC tree is a kind of multi-way tree. In order to locate and create conveniently a tree, this paper adopts a child-sibling list to transform the multi-way tree to a binary permission tree. A depth-first traversal algorithm was adopted recursively in the tree spanning function TAccessBTree::CreateTree(TNode *root) , as shown in figure 6 . It can be seen from the figure that there were two steps in the spanning process of a binary permission tree(See Algorithm 1), which were the creation of a multi-way permission tree (See Figure 6a) and the transform from a multi-way tree to a binary tree(See Figure 6b) . Figure a shows a nodes relation in the depth-first traversal of a multi-way permission tree, where the dotted line indicates nodes that has not been generated yet, tNode denotes the nodes that will be generated soon, and pNode is a left neighbor brother of tNode. A further analysis can show that the nodes creation process must meet a constraint of the following rule 5. Figure b shows a transform that must meet a constraint of the following rule 6, from a multi-way tree to a child-sibling list binary tree. Rule 6 Let T ij ∈GList be a tree and r ij be its root node. Then, the former multi-way tree can be represented by a generalized list as T m = (r 0 , (T 0,1 ,T 0,2 ,…,T 0,C0 )), where T i,j = (r i,j , (T j,1 ,T j,2 ,…,T j,cj ))， 0≤i≤c 0 ， 1≤j≤c i . And the corresponding binary tree can be represented as T b = (r 0 , T 0,1 ), where 
Experiment and analysis
In the experiment part, this paper adopted a widely used cloud simulation platform CloudSim [13] , which was developed by the University of Melbourne. In order to make the experimental environment to be close to the real cloud computing scene, we firstly introduced 13 federate models from paper [11] . Then, we set up a service interactive scene TPSAC Simulation in the CloudSim. After that, we configured the corresponding Service Provider(SP) and Service Consumer(SC) as SP={SCUT_CCNL_Srv1, CMU_CQ_Srv1，CMU_CQ_Srv2}, SC={USER1， USER2， USER3， USER4， USER5}. The other experiment configurations were similar as [18] . Figure 7 showed a resource utilization of Provider CMU_CQ_Srv1. Kinematics simulation analysis can be performed after introducing the TPSAC model and several scene models to the CloudSim simulation platform. In fact, the federate simulation process is also the process of kinematics as well as dynamic parameter calculating. Because of the limited space, this paper gives only the simulation results of former cam behavioral model, of which include velocity, acceleration and supports reaction, as shown in figure 8 . A conclusion that the whole cam design can meets the parameter requirement of fed cpm and our TPSAC model is more suitable for the cloud simulation can be obtained after a comparison with the result in [18] . 
Conclusion
This paper proposed and realized a tree proxy-based and service-oriented access control (TPSAC) model from the aspects of the simulation frame, the simulation process and the simulation algorithm. Currently, the TPSAC model was applied to several actual lab projects, such as the simulation scene from the virtual factory and that from the virtual campus roaming, and showed a preferable result. By introducing a quantized and dynamic binary permission tree, the TPSAC model made it more flexible to load and manage the access control process, meeting requirements from the more complex practical cloud simulation applications.
